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Sexually Explicit Speech
by JERRoLD J. KIPPEN*
"[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakesselectively
to shield the publicfrom some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others, the FirstAmendment strictly
limits its power."
I. Introduction
Our structure of rights and their limitations presupposes a
society composed of autonomous moral actors. It also recognizes the
need to continually strive towards a coherent expression of our
common values. As circumstances change, the balance between these
two fundamental interests requires constant re-evaluation. Quite
simply, we, as a society, need to talk about them. The quality of that
discourse, however, is diminished whenever equality is not ascribed to
and protected for all its participants. It is crucial, therefore, that the
courts not short-circuit this discourse by deciding ahead of time what
the norms of civility should be.
In order to avoid this pitfall, the Supreme Court has traditionally
distinguished
between
content-specific
and
content-neutral
restrictions on speech.2 Content-specific regulations, because they
directly target the speech of an individual or group, presumptively
violate the First Amendment and are subject to strict scrutiny.' In
order to pass constitutional muster, these regulations must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.4 In practice,

* Law Clerk for the Honorable John S. Unpingco, Chief Judge, United States
District Court for the District of Guam, 2001-03; Hastings College of the Law, Class of
2001.
1. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,209 (1975).
2. Stephan Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment, 34 STAN. L. RuV.
113 (1981). The Supreme Court, however, has not always drawn this distinction. See id. at
121-23.
3. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,462-63 & n.7 (1980).
4. Id.at 461-62.
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very few content-based restrictions on speech survive the strict
scrutiny applied to them.'
Content-neutral regulations presumably target conduct.
Because, however, these regulations have a limiting effect on speech,
they are still subject to First Amendment scrutiny and are analyzed
according to one of two tests.6 Those that govern the time, place and
manner of speech must be justified by a significant governmental
interest and must leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.7 Regulations indirectly affecting speech must: (1) be
enacted under constitutionally legitimate authority, (2) be unrelated
to the suppression of free expression, (3) further a substantial state
interest, and (4) be no greater than essential to achieve the state
interest.8 Where the limitations on speech under these regulations are
considered merely incidental to the necessary regulation of the target
conduct, they pass constitutional muster.
Unfortunately, not all regulations affecting speech are easily
amenable to this analysis. This is due to the Court-created category
of low-value speech, which expresses the view that "not all speech is
of equal First Amendment importance."9 Regulations affecting this
type of speech are sometimes called content-based, yet are analyzed
under the lower standards applied to non-content-based speech. At
other times, regulations which are clearly content-based are simply
considered non-content-based by the Court. Furthermore, exactly
what kinds of speech the Court believes to be low in value are
difficult to pinpoint because the Court's use of this theory has been
marked by vacillation and uncertainty.10 At one time or another, the
5. One commentator has noted that as of 1987, "outside the realm of low-value
speech, the Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it has
considered in the past thirty years." Geoffrey Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 46,48 (1987).
6. David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards .for the Free
Speech Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195,200-01 (1987).
7. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
8. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). These two approaches are not
always distinct. Some opinions have treated them as interchangeable. See United States
v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-90 (1985); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288,293 (1984); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring).
9. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749. 758 (1985)
(holding credit report a matter of purely private concern and therefore of lesser
constitutional value than a matter of public concern).
10. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297, 298
(1995).
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Court has held fighting words, child pornography, profanity, libel and
commercial speech to be of low value."
The status of another member of this category, non-obscene
sexually explicit speech, is perhaps the most difficult to decipher. The
Court has held that the government may ban obscenity, including
obscene forms of adult entertainment. Some members of the Court,
though not quite a majority, would add non-obscene sexually explicit
expression to the list. 3 On the other hand, the majority of the Court
has held that non-obscene sexually explicit speech merits First
Amendment protection. 4 Repeatedly, the Court has stated that
material outside the
nudity alone does not place otherwise protected
5
mantle of First Amendment protection.1
In 1973, the Court announced the current standard for
distinguishing between illegal obscenity and protected expression. 6 If
(1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (2) the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3)
the work, as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value, then the work constitutes obscenity and does not
merit First Amendment protection.
States, however, encountered difficulty in applying this test.
This became evident in Jenkins v. Georgia: the Court unanimously
reversed the obscenity conviction of a movie theater owner who had
shown a sexually explicit film. 9 Writing for the Court, Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that, under Miller, only the most explicit,
hard-core materials fall outside of constitutional protection.' As a
11. I1. at 299.
12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973).
13. See Shaman, supra note 10 at 299 n.10.
14. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (holding that the setting of
an adult book store or commercial theater is presumptively protected by the First
Amendment); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding that like
political and ideological speech, adult entertainment is constitutionally protected); Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (holding nude dancing entitled to First Amendment
protection).
15. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211-12.
16. Miller,413 U.S. at 24.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Jenkins, 418 U.S. 153.
19. 1d at 155.
20. See id. at 160.
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result, only a small portion of the broad range of sexually explicit
materials available to the public has been held "obscene." These
include materials depicting flagellation,2' bestiality,22 and "hard core"
sexual conduct.'
As a result, local governments have attempted to regulate nonobscene sexually explicit speech in a variety of ways.24 The three most
common regulations involve (1) licensing or permitting; (2) zoning
ordinances;2 6 and (3) public nudity laws.27 Given the supposed
protected status of this category or "content" of speech one would
expect that each of these types of regulation would be subject to strict
scrutiny. In actuality, however, the Court's treatment of these cases
has not been so clear cut and has instead reflected the Court's
vacillation and uncertainty regarding the protected status of nonobscene sexually explicit speech.
In Parts II, III, and IV, this note will argue that the Court's
treatment of non-obscene sexually explicit speech in the form of
licensing , zoning, and nudity regulations has weakened the scrutiny
applied to all speech regulations. Likewise, the Supreme Court's
treatment of non-obscene sexually explicit speech provides a clear
illustration of its failure to respect the equality principle of the First
Amendment, inappropriately short-circuiting society's discourse by
grounding the Court's decisions in notions of offense or morality.
The effort here is not to articulate a defense of non-obscene
sexually explicit speech, but to expose the inconsistency in and
damage to the First Amendment doctrine as a whole caused by the
Court's improper infusion of notions of offense or morality into their
holdings. If non-obscene sexual speech regulation is content-based,
then the Court's treatment has weakened First Amendment strict
scrutiny.
Alternatively, where the Court has "treated" such
regulations as non-content-based, it has reduced the scope of strict
scrutiny protection and struck a damaging blow to the very heart of
the content/non-content distinction. In either case, such lip-service
protection of low-value speech has weakened First Amendment

21. See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767,771-72 (1977).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451,453-54 (4th Cir. 1987).
23. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 92-93, 100 (1974).
24. See John M. Armento, Effective Regulation of Adult EntertainmentUses, 26 Real
Est. L.J. 69 (1997).
25. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
26. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

Summer 2001]

SEXUALLY EXPLICIT SPEECH

protection and threatens even the traditional bastion of First
Amendment guarantees-political speech. Finally, Part V will
conclude that because notions of offense or indecency do not turn on
the distinction between content and non-content, regulations limiting
non-obscene sexually explicit speech should be analyzed as contentbased and subject to strict scrutiny.
H. Li-"censoring" Sexually Explicit Speech
A. Background
A prior restraint exists where the government requires that a
party comply with a regulational scheme before engaging in
expressive conduct.' Prior restraints are not per se unconstitutional.'
Traditionally, any prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against
its constitutionality.'
In the case of adult businesses, local
governments can require a business to obtain a permit or license
before engaging in or offering live adult entertainment."
The constitutionality of these prior restraints, however, depends
on two factors. "[A] law cannot condition the free exercise of First
Amendment rights on the 'unbridled discretion' of government
officials." 32 A prior restraint lacking narrow, objective and definite
standards to guide administering authorities is unconstitutional.33
Furthermore, unbridled discretion exists when a licensing scheme
lacks adequate procedural safeguards to ensure a prompt decision.'
B. Freedmanv. Maryland
The seminal case establishing procedural protections against
prior restraints is Freedman v. Maryland.5 In Freedman, the Court
held that "a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission
of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes
place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of

28. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,713-15 (1931).
29. FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 225.
30. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,57 (1965).
31. East Foothill Blvd., Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 912 F. Supp. 1268,1273 (1996).
32. Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 914 (1991).
33. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,150-51 (1969).
34. FWIPBS, 493 U.S. 215 at 227; East FoothillBlvd., Inc., 912 F. Supp. at 1274.
35. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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a censorship system. 36 The Court mandated three procedural
safeguards against such prior restraints.'
"First, the burden of
proving that a film is unprotected expression must rest on the
censor."38 Second, any restraint issued in advance of a final judicial
determination must do no more than preserve the status quo for the
shortest feasible period.3 9 Finally, the procedure must proride for a
prompt judicial decision."
Freedman involved a Maryland law4' requiring all motion picture
exhibitors to submit films to the State Board of Censors before
showing the films.42 The statute created an invalid prior restraint on a
protected form of expression because the initial decision of the Board
of Censors effectively barred exhibition of any disapproved film,
leaving exhibitors with the sole recourse of a successful appeal in
Maryland court.43
In subsequent applications, the Court
demonstrated rigorous application of the Freedman test and great
suspicion of any system of prior restraint' -rigorous and great, that
is, until 1990, when the Court applied the test to an ordinance
regulating sexually explicit speech.

36. Id. at 58.
37. Id at 58-59.
38. Id.at 58.
39. Id.at 59.
40. Prompt judicial review would guard against both an administrative refusal to
grant the license even after the expiration of a temporary restraint and the deterrent effect
of an errant temporary denial of a license. Id.at 59. The Court provided what it believed
to be an example of acceptable procedural safeguards in a statutory scheme. The Court
explained a New York procedure for preventing the sale of obscene books: "That
procedure postpones any restraint against sale until a judicial determination of obscenity
following notice and an adversary hearing. The statute provides for a hearing one day
after the joinder of issue; the judge must hand down his decision within t\ro days after
termination of the hearing." Id. (citing Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957)).
41. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66A, § 2 (1957).
42. A Baltimore theater owner challenged the statute by exhibiting the film,
"Revenge at Daybreak" without first submitting it to the censorship board. The state
conceded that the film did not violate the statutory standards and would have been
approved if submitted. Freedman,380 U.S. at 52.
43. Id-at 54-55.
44. See, e.g., Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1983); Sec'y of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
45. See FW/PBS, 493 U.S. 215.
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C. FWIPBS v. City of Dallas

FW/PBS concerned a Dallas city ordinance which required
sexually oriented businesses to submit to inspections before obtaining
a license, moving into a new building, changing the use of a structure,
changing the ownership of the business, or applying for annual
permits." The Chief of Police was required to approve the issuance
of the license within thirty days of receipt of the application but the
permit could not issue before the health department, fire department,
The ordinance
and the building official approved the premises.'
neither set a time limit within which these inspections had to occur,'
nor provided a means of recourse for the applicants if the license was
not issued within thirty days.49
Because the prior restraint lacked the procedural safeguard of a
time limit, Justice O'Connor found the Dallas ordinance
The Justices, however, concluded that the
unconstitutional."
regulatory scheme did not present the "grave 'dangers of a censorship
system,"' and therefore, was not subject to the full protections of
Freedman.5 According to Justice O'Connor, Freedman'sunderlying
policy provides that a license for a business protected by the First
Amendment must be issued within a reasonable period of time,
because undue delay suppresses protected speech.
Justice O'Connor distinguished the Freedman ordinance from
the Dallas ordinance in two ways. First, the censor in Freedman
engaged in direct censorship of particular expressive material. Such
regulation is presumptively invalid,53 and therefore required the
censor to bear the burden of justifying its actions.' In contrast, Dallas
did not review the content of or exercise discretion over particular
expressive speech; instead, the city examined each license applicant's
Justice O'Connor deemed that this
overall qualifications. 55

46. IL at 225.
47. Id. at 227 (citing DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE ch. 41A, Sexually Oriented
Businesses § 41A-5(a)(6) (1986)).
48. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227.

49. Id
50. Id. at 229.
51. Id (citing Freedman,380 U.S. at 58).
52. Id at 228.

53. Id at 229.
54. Id.

55. Id.
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56
"ministerial action" is not presumptively invalid.
Second, in Freedman, the obstacles to litigating or appealing an
adverse decision by the censor were so great that a censor's refusal
was tantamount to complete suppression of speech 7 In Dallas,
however, the applicant had more at stake because the temporary
restriction on speech threatened the applicant's entire livelihood, not
merely one movie. 8 Therefore, Justice O'Connor posited that the
Dallas licensing procedure would not deter applicants from appealing
a license denial in the courts. 9 Thus, although the Dallas ordinance
was subject to the second' and the third61 prongs of the Freedman
test, the city did not bear the burden of proving the speech was
unprotected. 62
Although Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment in
FW/PBS, once again he disagreed with the Court's inconsistent
application of constitutional analysis. Justice Brennan argued that
the procedural protections guaranteed by Freedman do not vary with
the facts of the case.6 Justice Brennan argued that the Court's
decision in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina,Inc.,' required the Court to apply all three prongs of the
Freedman test.6 In Riley, a licensing scheme applying only to
professional fund-raisers did not provide for a specified period of
time in which the licensor had to issue the license.66 The Court held
that the regulation was unconstitutional because the indefinite delay
compelled the speaker's silence.
Justice Brennan found the
ordinance in Riley indistinguishable from the Dallas ordinance.6
Thus, he reiterated what he had previously stressed in Riley 9 and
Freedman," that the failure to make the licensor bear the burden in

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 229-30.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
See supra text accompanying note 40.
FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 230.
Id. at 239.
487 U.S. 781 (1988).
FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 238-39.
Riley, 487 U.S. at 801-02.
Id. at 802.
FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 240-41.
487 U.S. at 802.
380 U.S. at 58-59.
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court might discourage the speaker from asserting his First
Amendment rights in that jurisdiction and, accordingly, protected
speech would be improperly suppressed.7'
Despite dropping the first Freedman requirement, the plurality
opinion held the scheme unconstitutional on the grounds that it did
not limit restraint prior to judicial review to a "specified brief period"
and that it failed to offer an applicant "expeditious judicial review" of
an adverse decision.73 In discussing these two requirements,74 the
Court noted that while licensing schemes do not present the same
"grave dangers" of direct censorship, they do create the possibility
that speech will be infringed upon unless there are adequate
safeguards ensuring prompt review.
"Where the licensor has
unlimited time within which to issue a license, the risk of arbitrary
suppression is as great as the provision of unbridled discretion."7'
The plurality failed, however, to offer any further elucidation on
the meaning of "prompt judicial review" other than its vague
directive that "[t]he core policy underlying Freedman is that the
license for a First Amendment protected business must be issued
within a reasonable period of time because undue delay results in the
unconstitutional suppression of protected speech."7
Justice
O'Connor did, however, mention the prompt judicial review
requirement three times in her opinion. In each case, she referred to
the safeguard as requiring "the possibility of," or "an avenue for," or
"availability of" prompt judicial review.78
This ambiguous language has created a sharp split of authority
among the circuits. The First, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
have held that prompt "access" to judicial review is sufficient. 79 The
Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that FW/PBS requires a
prompt "decision" on the merits.80 Thus, the ambiguous language of
71. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 241-42.
72. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
73. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227,229.
74. See supranotes 39 and 40.
75. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228.
76. Id. at 227.
77. Id. at 228.
78. Id- at 228-30.
79. Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 1327 (1st Cir.
1993); TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1994); Graff v.
City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Boss Capital, Inc. v. City
of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir. 1999).
80. 11126 Baltimore Blvd., Inc. v. Prince George's County, Md., 58 F.3d 988, 998-1001
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the plurality in FW/PBS has caused confusion8 and has gravely
weakened the second Freedman requirement in the First, Fifth,
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.

In any event, the Court disregarded precedent when it ruled that
Freedman did not have to be followed in its entirety. In so doing, the
majority of the Court has assumed that a deprived licensee will try to
vindicate a lost right to speak.8 That assumption is improper because
the First Amendment presumes the validity of speech.3 Whereas the
First Amendment does provide for the "right" of speech, it is first and
foremost an "immunity" from government regulation of speech:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."'"
In other words, the burden is on the government to show that its
regulation of speech does not offend the Constitution. Where
sexually explicit speech is concerned, however, the Court is merely
paying lip-service to this presumption.' If a licensing ordinance,
when challenged, is presumed to be "constitutionally invalid," it
stands to reason that the licensor must prove the validity of the
ordinance. The licensee should not be required to vigorously assert a
right against a statute that is presumed to be invalid.' 6 Until FW/PBS,
a person had not been required to litigate her right to speak. Thus,

(4th Cir. 1995) (en bane); East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 225
(6th Cir. 1995); Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998).
The Ninth Circuit recently revisited its holding in Baby Tam. Baby Tam & Co. v. City of
Las Vegas 199 F.3d 1111 (2000) (Baby Tam II). The court held that a new Nevada
statutory scheme providing for mandamus review of an adverse decision within twentyfive days and ruling within thirty days thereafter was constitutional. Id. at 1113-15.
However, they held that the scheme still failed to meet the second Freedman requirement
limiting the time officials have to issue licenses. Id. at 1114-15. California currently has
legislation pending which addresses both Freedmanrequirements, as the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted them. See S.1165,1999 Leg. (Cal. 1999).
81. The Second Circuit has advised legislatures to follow the lead of New York City
and avoid the prior restraint perplexities altogether by establishing parameters for adult
business operation within the zoning code proper and not requiring special operating
permits. 801 Conklin St. Ltd. v. The Town of Babylon, 38 F. Supp. 2d 228,249 (E.D.N.Y.
1999). Of course, this leads to the difficulties involved with zoning and the First
Amendment. See supra section II.
82- FW/PBS,493 U.S. at 229-30.
83. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). "Any system of prior
restraints.., comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity." Id. (See also infra note 90 and accompanying text.)
84. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85. See Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist
View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727,728 (1980). "Obviously, there is a discrepancy between theory and
practice in this area of first amendment law." Id.
86. See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,259 (1964).
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the Court's treatment of sexually explicit speech has had a disastrous
effect on the doctrine of prior restraintY
I1. Sticks and Stones... But "Words"?:
Zoning Away Sexually Explicit Speech
A. Background
The outcome of the Court's deliberations over the definition of
obscenity created a host of procedural guarantees to protect nonobscene sexual speech from overzealous government censors." This
resulted in an uneasy compromise between the acknowledged value
of some sexual speech and the acknowledged legitimacy of society's
desire to regulate it. This tension is reflected in the Court's
reasoning. Rather than classify this type of speech as obscene, a
number of the Court's decisions refer to this type of speech as less
valuable than other types of speech. The practical effect of this
analysis has been to afford a greater degree of deference to the state's
policing powers than was traditionally accorded in cases involving
speech meriting First Amendment protection. The line of cases
involving zoning ordinances provides a particularly good example of
this deterioration of First Amendment analysis.
B. Young v. American Mini Theatres
Young v. American Mini Theatres' was the first Supreme Court
decision in which the "low value" theory was offered as a justification
for upholding a regulation of sexual speech.' There is little reason to
believe that Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion,
intended to create a new system for classifying speech with his remark
that "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities'
exhibited in the theaters of our choice.""' Nevertheless, the idea that
87. Interestingly, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, opined that none
of the Freedman safeguards were necessary, arguing that the ordinance was a valid time,
place, and manner content-neutral restriction intended to address Renton-like secondary
effects. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 244. This would do less harm to the prior restraint doctrine
but adds judicial weight to the unfortunate secondary effects doctrine. See supra section
II.

88. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
89. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
90. Id. at 70-71.
91. Id.at 70. It should be noted that the "low-value" theory was only one of several
rationales Justice Stevens offered for the Court's decision.
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non-obscene sexual speech is less deserving of protection than other
types of speech has continued to surface at the periphery of First

Amendment jurisprudence.' In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,93 for
example, the Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit
the FCC from censoring indecent language on radio broadcasts.'
Justice Stevens' majority opinion is far from clear, but he did
explicitly state that indecent speech is low in the hierarchy of First
Amendment values:95 "society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate ....

96

He acknowledged,

however, that such speech is not entirely outside of the protection of
the First Amendment,' suggesting, perhaps, that "low-value" speech

is not a separate category, meriting something less than strict scrutiny
analysis.
A closer examination of Young reveals that Justice Stevens
characterized the zoning ordinance involved as a time, place and
manner restriction-a content-neutral analysis-on speech because it
did not substantially restrict the number of locations at which adult
businesses could operate. 9' He went on, however, to state that the

ordinance was valid because the government could regulate speech
"on the basis of content without violating its paramount obligation of
92. One interpretation of the low-value theory is that the Court is reopening the
debate over the definition of obscenity. By devaluing non-obscene sexual speech, the
Court might expand the definition of obscenity to cover a wider range of material. If this
is the Court's intention, however, it certainly has made no effort to say so explicitly.
Indeed, the low-value theory seems to have its intellectual roots in Robert Bork's
reinterpretation of the First Amendment, rather than in the obscenity debate. See Robert
Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971)
(arguing that only political speech should be constitutionally protected).
93. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
94. Id. at 744-51.
95. Id. at 743. Characteristically, Justice Stevens presented a number of justifications
for upholding the governor's action. Although he characterized the speech as low-value,
he also assumed, arguendo, that it is protected in some contexts. Id, at 746. He then
concluded that it is not protected in the context of radio broadcasts. Id. at 748. This
conclusion was based on Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,395 U.S. 367 (1967), which
established the FCC's authority to regulate a limited resource, the airwaves, in the interest
of promoting First Amendment values. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748: Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 386-90 (offering underlying rationale of the fairness doctrine). This suggests
that the decision in Pacifica Foundation was not based so much on relegating the speech in
question to any low-value category as it was on balancing the interests in one type of
speech with the interests in encouraging speech in general.
96. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J.).
97. PacificaFoundation,438 U.S. at 746.
98. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
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neutrality

in

its

regulation

of

protected

communication."99

Furthermore, Justice Stevens never explicitly stated

that the

ordinance was content-neutral. What is clear is that he did not apply
the strict scrutiny test as content-based regulation demands."0
Justice Stevens did suggest that the ordinance was view-point
neutral because it was applied regardless of the views espoused."'

This may have been the rationale for a more relaxed standard."o
Much scholarly literature supports the view that the central concern

of the First Amendment is censorship; therefore, a restriction
affecting an entire subject without regard to a particular viewpoint
should be treated as content-neutral.'0 3

This position, however, is difficult to defend.
First, the
characterization of adult-use restrictions as view-point neutral is
questionable. 04 More importantly, view-point based restrictions are
not the major concern in the realm of sexual speech, as they are in the
realm of political speech. Restrictions on political speech are likely to

be motivated by the desire to keep certain views from being aired.
Restrictions on sexual speech, on the other hand, are likely to be
motivated by distaste for the entire subject, regardless of the
viewpoint expressed. The perceived danger of sexual speech is not

the view it espouses, but the words or symbols themselves. Our
emotional reaction to sexual speech, like our reaction to the word
"fuck," stems not from the idea it expresses, but from the violation of

99. Id. at 70.
100. Justice Stevens did not make clear which standard of review he used. He clearly
recognized the ordinance as a time, place, and manner restriction, id. at 71-72, and
ultimately concluded that the ordinance did not affect the message the books or movies
intended to communicate. Id. at 70. This suggests that he considered the ordinance a
content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, thus warranting intermediate scrutiny.
On the other hand, he spent the bulk of the opinion discussing when the government may
regulate speech based on content, IL at 63-70, suggesting that he considered the ordinance
content-based, thus requiring strict scrutiny.
101. See id. at 70.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Farber, Content Regulation of the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist View,
68 GEO. L.J. 727,737 (1980).
104. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Indianapolis ordinance banning erotic materials featuring the "subordination of women"
characterized as "thought control"), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See also Barnes,
Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 37, 53-54 (1985);
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. CI. L. REV. 81, 109-111 (1978); L. Tribe, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 800 n.23 (2d ed. 1988).
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social taboos; it is a matter of cultural effrontery. °5 The risk is that
this emotional reaction will motivate excessive government
censorship of all discussion on the topic, regardless of the viewpoint.
Therefore, the Court should be more, rather than less, suspicious of
subject-matter restrictions of sexual speech."°
Justice Stevens also contributed a rationale that is considered the
genesis of the "secondary effects" doctrine." This approach focuses
on the. government's justification for the restriction. According to
Stevens' analysis, the government would have enacted the ordinance
regardless of what types of books and movies the business sold, if
selling them contributed to urban blight. Therefore, he concluded
that the restriction was not aimed at the content of the books and
movies. It was "this secondary effect which these ordinances
attempt[ed] to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech."'"
Ten years later the Court would give full weight to the secondary
effects doctrine.
C. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Ina
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,"° the Court upheld
an adult-use zoning ordinance similar to the Detroit ordinance upheld
in Young."' This time, the Court's opinion, written by Justice
Rehnquist, commanded a clear majority. Only Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented."' The Court held that adult-use ordinances
should be treated as content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions, provided that they are designed primarily to combat the
secondary effects of adult businesses and are not related to the
suppression of speech."' As Justice Rehnquist framed the test, the
105. Cf Carla West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Coalition and the
1986 Attorney General's Commission on PornographyReport, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
681. West accepts the argument that the harm of pornography stems from its violation of
"unconventional, non-reproductive, and unacceptable sexual relationships, values,
lifestyles and techniques." Id. at 691. This argument sounds like a post hoc justification,
however. It is doubtful that a pamphlet advocating unconventional lifestyles and extolling
the virtues of non-reproductive sex would hardly arouse the emotional reaction the
average skin flick produces among the antipornography advocates.
106. The Court has rejected viewpoint-neutrality as a substitute for content-neutrality.
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,319 (1988).
107. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
10& Boos, 485 at 319 (1988).
109. 475 U.S. 41 (1986):
110. Id.at 54-55.
111. Id. at 55. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. Id
112. Id. at 49.

Summer 20011

SEXUALLY EXPLICIT SPEECH

ordinance is constitutional if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial government interest and allows for reasonable alternative
avenues of communication.'
It is significant that in addition to the
secondary effects rationale, Justice Rehnquist relied on Justice
Stevens' language in Young that implied that sexual speech is less
valuable than political speech." '
Further, although the Court
recognized the content basis of the ordinance, the "low value" of the
speech shifted the analysis to the lower degree scrutiny applied to
non-content based regulation.
The decision also discussed a number of issues related to the
correct application of the test. First, Justice Rehnquist considered the
rule, applied by some lower courts, that an ordinance is invalid if a
desire to suppress was a motivating factor in its enactment. U5 He
affirmed the relevance of the government's motive but held that the
desire to suppress speech will not render an ordinance
unconstitutional unless suppression was the government's primary
motive for enacting the ordinance. 6 Supposedly, the purpose of
inquiring into the government's motive was to ensure that an
ordinance was justified without reference to the content of the
speech; the purpose was not open, however, to "unrestrained
debate. '17 Thus, intent to suppress a specific category of speech was
not enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
The Court also greatly relaxed the burden on the city to provide
a record in support of its zoning scheme. It'held that the city could
use data from similar cities to justify regulating adult uses, provided it
reasonably believed the data was relevant to the city's problems. s
This holding responded to a series of cases striking down ordinances
because cities had failed to provide evidence of neighborhood
deterioration."9 Justice Rehnquist did not directly disapprove of
113. IL at 50.
114. Id. at 49 n.2 ("[I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate .... .") (quoting Young, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)) (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 47 (citing Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 466 U.S. 872 (1984)). See also Ebel v. City of Corona (Ebel I), 698 F.2d 390, 393
(9th Cir. 1983); Kuzinich v. Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1982). As these
cases suggest, the Ninth Circuit was the primary architect of this rule.
116. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (1985) (holding that the district court's finding that the
city's predominant intent was unrelated to suppression of speech is sufficient to sustain the
ordinance).
117. See id.
118. IMEat 51-52.
119. See, e.g., Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir.
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these cases, concluding that cities need not await deterioration to

act.' 2°
Since Renton, however, courts have tended to require little, if
any, evidence of deterioration in the city in question.' Further, the
evidence courts have accepted as "empirical" has largely amounted to
"studies" conducted by government-appointed commissions, relying
on statistical correlation and anecdotal evidence."

The statistical

correlations provide only for evidence of a relationship, not cause.
While the anecdotal evidence has been almost exclusively provided

by parties whose interest in regulating such speech is, at a minimum,
suspect.

Although the Court has never addressed Renton's applicability to
non-sexually explicit communication, a plurality in Boos v. Barry'"
appears to have endorsed the extension of the secondary effects
doctrine to political speech. 4 Boos dealt with a restriction on speech
critical of foreign governments outside of their embassies."z While a
majority of the Court held the restriction unconstitutional,"" at least
six Justices may have thought that analysis under the secondary
1981); Ellwest Stereo Theatres v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702, 706-707 (N.D. Tex. 1979); E&B
Enter. v. City of Univ. Park, 449 F. Supp. 695,696-97 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
120. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
121. See, e.g., Stringfellow's v. City of New York, 694 N.E.2d 407 (1998).
122. Steve McMillen, Adult Uses and the FirstAmendment: The Stringfellow's Decision
and Its Impact on MunicipalControl of Adult Businesses, 15 TOURO L. REv. 241,251-260
(1998). It is possible, however, that this part of the Renton holding may be overturned in
the near future. The Court, in 44 Liquormart,Inc., v. Rhode Island, struck dovxn a Rhode
Island statute that prohibited retail price information in alcoholic beverage
advertisements. 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). In 44 Liquormart, the Court revisited the
application of the long-standing test for determining the validity of a government
regulation concerning commercial speech, a test virtually identical to time, place, and
manner regulations of noncommercial speech, which was approved under Renton. IL at
494-95. Under Renton and its progeny, the Court has long held that courts are to defer to
the legislative judgment regarding the substantiality of the governmental interest and
whether the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve those interests. However, in 44
Liquormart,the Court suggested that it would "carefully examine" the substantiality of a
governmental interest and the evidence relied on by the government to establish that the
regulation substantially advances that interest. See id. at 504 (reviewing the price
advertising ban with "special care"). Therefore, it may well be that a locality will have to
do more in the future than merely rely on the experience and studies from other cities.
Plainly, the enactment of a zoning ordinance supported solely by the concern of residents
and public officials pertaining to the location of adult businesses in their community would
fail to withstand this type of searching scrutiny.
123. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
124. See id. at 321 (O'Connor, J.)
125. Id. at 315.
126. Id. at 329.
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effects doctrine was relevant."

Thus, despite its purpose, the secondary effects doctrine has had
a corrosive impact on First Amendment protections. Any regulatory
objective, whether it is inadvertent or deliberate, can constitute a
secondary effect. Under the doctrine, a seemingly content-based law
becomes analyzed as content-neutral if the speech restriction is
"justifiedwithout reference to the content of the regulated speech.""
The secondary effects rationale also waters down the level of
constitutional protection for speech affected by a genuinely contentneutral law. If a court identifies certain secondary effects the
regulation was designed to address, the content-neutral restriction on
speech will pass constitutional muster.
Professor Tribe heavily criticized the Renton decision: "The
Renton view should be quickly renounced. Carried to its logical
conclusion, such a doctrine could gravely erode the First
Tribe warned: the danger in the
Amendment's protections. ' '
Renton decision is that the "secondary effects" could subject "most, if
not all, speech" to regulation.' ° Another commentator criticized the
Court's first two adult entertainment zoning/secondary effects cases
as creating new categories of speech."'
Nor did these difficulties go unnoticed by Justice Brennan, who
127. Justice O'Connor emphasized two points: "Listeners' reactions to speech are not
the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton" and "[t]he emotive impact of the
speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect."' Id. at 321. However, she implies the
law would be constitutional if it focused on "the 'secondary effects' of picket signs" such as
"congestion," "interference with ingress and egress," or "visual clutter." See id. See also
Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
615,633 (1991).
128. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (quoting Virginia Pharm. Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (emphasis in the original).
129. Tribe, supra 104, § 12-19.
130. Id See also Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975)
(pointing out that speech restrictions are generally justified on the basis of "some danger
beyond the message, such as a danger of riot, unlawful action or violent overthrow of the
government"); Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrineand the Burger Court,68 Cal. L. Rev.
422,472 (1980) ("Virtually all governmental controls of expression are directed, not at the
expression itself, but at the harm thought to result from engaging in it.").
131. Gianni P. Servodidio, Comment, The Devaluation of Non-obscene Eroticism as a
Form of Expression Protectedby the FirstAmendment, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1231, 1237 (1993).
See also City of Colorado Springs v. 2354 Inc., 896 P.2d 272,294 n.16 (Colo. 1995) ("It has
been noted by many commentators that Young-Renton line of cases are aberrational in the
sense that they apply a relaxed level of review to ordinances that could be characterized as
making content-based distinctions, thus distorting traditional freedom of expression
analysis in a questionable fashion.").
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authored a poignant concurring opinion in the Boos decision."
Emphasizing the danger inherent in the plurality opinion he wrote "to
register [his] continued disagreement with the proposition that an
otherwise content-based restriction on speech can be recast as
'content neutral' if the restriction 'aims' at 'secondary effects' of the
speech."''
Justice Brennan pointed out the "dangers and difficulties posed
by the Renton analysis."'"1 He rightly explained that there is no limit
to the secondary effects rationale: "[t]he Renton analysis... creates a
possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can
concoct 'secondary' rationalizations for regulating the content of
political speech."' 35 Justice Brennan accurately understood that the
Court's opinion in Boos opened the door for the secondary effects
rationale to be used beyond the adult entertainment field. Indeed,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit partially
relied on the secondary effect of "visual clutter"- mentioned as a
rationale by Justice O'Connor in Boos- to uphold a ban on
newspaper distribution boxes in a historic district. 37
Justice Brennan warned that the Court's use of the Renton
analysis "could set the Court on a road that will lead to the
evisceration of First Amendment freedoms."'' Although the "direct
emotive impact" exception has prevented some spillage of the
doctrine, 3' Justice Brennan's fear has become a reality. The
government has used the threat of secondary effects as the pretext to
regulate many kinds of expression, including indecent speech,"4

132. Boos, 485 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 335.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural, 100 F.3d 175, 185 (1st Cir.
1996). Interestingly, the First Circuit opinion cited Renton for its rationale, but not Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Boos, which actually mentioned the secondary effect of "visual
clutter." Id.; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
138. Boos, 485 U.S. at 338.
139. Id. at 314. See also Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
City officials attempted to justify an ordinance that allowed charging a parade organizer a
variable sum based on the cost it took to provide proper protection as a content-neutral
law. Id. at 126-27. The officials argued that "maintaining public order" was a secondary
effect. Id. at 134. The Court disagreed, ruling that "[1]isteners' reaction to speech is not a
content-neutral basis for regulation." Id.
140. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875-76 (1997) (Communications Decency
Act enacted for the "important purpose of 'protecting children' from exposure to indecent
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commercial speech, 4' and even political speech. 4 '

Government

officials have been quick to catch on to the rationale and their use of
it continues to proliferate.'43 The Supreme Court's failure to
articulate clearly when an effect is primary or secondary and whether
the analysis should be limited to adult entertainment zoning laws
threatens speech in all arenas.'"
Of course, not all courts have been so quick to assent to the
One state court found that a
secondary effects rationale.

municipality's statement as to secondary effects was nothing more
than "self-serving conclusory hearsay."' 45 Another lower court stated,

"[t]he obvious problem is that when a locational restriction is justified
by only the secondary effects of showing or selling constitutionally
protected materials, the restriction is unconstitutional if the feared
effects do not exist."' 4
The threat to First Amendment freedom posed by the secondary
effects doctrine may be alleviated by limiting its application to its
original purview of geographic zoning laws. But this would leave the
doctrine available for later attempts to re-extend it to other areas of
First Amendment doctrine, and would fail to correct the doctrinal

inconsistency the secondary effects doctrine has created with respect
to content discrimination in converting content-based laws into
content-neutral ones. The better solution would be to follow Justice

or obscene material).
141. See, e.g., Maryland II Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 28 F.3d 492, 496 (5th
Cir. 1994) (regulation of adult business advertising enacted to combat the "deleterious
effects" of such establishments).
142. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bax, 63 F.3d 154, 160 (2d Cir. 1995) (creation of separate area
for "anti-Clinton" demonstrators which provided less favorable access to the dignitary by
the New York Police based on the police and city's "safety concerns for the dignitary").
143. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (Tennessee state government
officials arguing that a state law prohibiting the solicitation of voters within 100 feet of a
polling place is content-neutral); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753
(1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997) (state officials arguing that
restrictions on anti-abortion protesters were justified because of the harmful secondary
effects of their speech).
144. See Robert Post, Recuperating the FirstAmendment Doctrine, 47 STAN L. REV.
1249, 1267 (1995). "[T]he Court has so far failed to articulate any substantive First
Amendment theory to guide its distinction between primary and secondary effects. The
Court has produced only particular judgments, more or less convincing on their own facts.
This failure of the First Amendment principle not only fundamentally impairs the
usefulness of secondary effects doctrine, it also poses serious dangers for freedom of
speech." Id
145. Discotheque v. City Council of Augusta, 449 S.E.2d 608,609 (Ga. 1994).
146. City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242,248 (Or. 1988).
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altogether." '

IV. "Stripping" Away First Amendment Protections
A. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.

The final common attempt to regulate sexually explicit speech
takes the form of public indecency or nudity laws. In Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc.,148 the Court analyzed the constitutionality of an Indiana

public indecency statute as it applied to nude dancing.'4
In an
opinion delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed the
decision by the court of appeals and held Indiana's public indecency
statute constitutional as applied.15° The Court agreed with the court
of appeals that non-obscene nude dancing is a form of expression
entitled to First Amendment protection."' However, unlike the court
of appeals, the Court interpreted Indiana's public indecency statute as
being a legitimate government regulation of a First Amendment
right.'52 Because the Court had granted First Amendment protection
to nude dancing, it then needed to determine the level of judicial
scrutiny this protection would be afforded.' The plurality reasoned
that Indiana's public indecency statute was a valid54opportunity for
application of the time, place, or manner restriction.1
The Court applied the four part content-neutral test developed
in United States v. O'Brien"5 for analysis of symbolic speech
regulation.'56 The Barnes plurality reasoned that the statute was
"clearly" within the state's constitutional power157 and furthered a
substantial government interest: the protection of societal "order and
morality."' 58 The Court then determined that the third prong of the
O'Brien test was satisfied because the State of Indiana was not
proscribing nude dancing by enforcement of its indecency statute;
147. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,338 (1988).
148. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 572.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 566.
Id.

155. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
156. See Barnes,501 U.S. at 566.
157. Id. at 567.
158. Id. at 569.
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rather it was proscribing public nudity.159 The Court concluded "[i]t is

without cavil that the public indecency statute is 'narrowly tailored';
Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a Gstring is modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the
state's purpose."''
Justice Scalia, concurring, agreed with the plurality that Indiana's
public indecency statute was constitutional.
In his opinion,
however, nude dancing is conduct. 62 Thus, it does not receive any
First Amendment protection." As a result, Justice Scalia would have
required only a rational basis for the regulation, which he found was
provided by the government's interest in regulating morality."6
Justice Souter casted the deciding vote. He agreed with the
plurality that nude dancing was entitled to a degree of First
Amendment protection 65 and that the O'Brien test was the proper
test to be applied to nude dancing."6 However, Justice Souter defined
the government's substantial interest differently from the plurality. 67
He did not regard the state's interest as protecting society's moral
beliefs, but as combating the negative "secondary effects" such as
drug use, prostitution and rape, assertedly caused by nude dancing."6
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice White and joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,6 did not view the Indiana
public indecency statute as a general prohibition of public nudity. 7°
The dissent regarded the statute, as applied by the State of Indiana, to
be directly related to the suppression of the expressive qualities that
nude dancing intends to convey.1
The dissent disagreed that either morality or the secondary
effects of nude dancing can be a sufficient purpose for justifying the

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
Id

1& at 570.
I& at 572.
1& (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id
Id. at 580.
Id.at 581 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id.at 582.
Id.
Id.at 582, 584.
Id.at 587 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.at 592.
Id at 593. The dissent also granted First Amendment protection to nude dancing.
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proscription of an expressive activity." Furthermore, the dissent
reasoned that the enforcement of the public indecency statute was
related to the expressive qualities of the nude dance.73 "It is only
because nude dancing performances may generate emotions and
feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the spectators that the
State seeks to regulate such expressive activity...."" According to
the dissent, the statute was a content-based regulation and required
the most exacting level of judicial scrutiny."' Under the dissent's
analysis, the statute did not meet this heightened test.76
Additionally, the dissent was dissatisfied with Justice Souter's
logic.' Justice White reasoned that if the state's aim was to decrease
the secondary effects of nude dancing, and the means of achieving
this end required "covering up" the nudity, then it follows that
nudity's expressive value must have had some relation to the
government's interest.' If the nudity was not a form of expression,
then it would not have had an effect on criminal activity. 79
Justice White also criticized both the plurality's and Justice
Souter's conclusions that the statute was narrowly drawn.'
He
suggested alternative measures which the state could have
implemented to regulate the dancing without broadly censoring an
entire category of expressive behavior.'
Finally, the dissent focused upon specific defects in Justice
Scalia's reasoning." Justice White reiterated his disagreement with
Justice Scalia's claim that the statute's prohibition was general in
nature.'
Further, he asserted that Indiana's reason for the
prohibition was to prevent the customers of adult establishments
from being exposed to the expressive elements of dance."84 Therefore,
Justice Scalia's observation was exactly on point: "Where the
172. Id. at 590, 594.
173. Id. at 592.
174. Id. "Nudity, as an expressive element of nude dancing, cannot be separated from
the expressive qualities of the dance into the category of 'mere conduct."' ML
175. Id. at 593.
176. Id. at 595.
177. Id. at 594.
178. Id. at 591-92.
179. Id. at 591.
180. Id. at 594.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 595-96.
183. Id.
184. /L at 591.
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government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative
attributes, we hold the regulation unconstitutional."' '
Justice White's criticisms illustrate well how, once again, the
Court's ambiguous posture towards sexually explicit speech has
affected the logic of its First Amendment analysis. If nude dancing is
protected expression and its message is one of eroticism, as eight of
the nine Justices held, then arguably it is precisely this erotic message
that Indiana is targeting. If so, the statute is content-based as applied
-unless it applies to all occurrences of public nudity."6 Yet,
enforcement is specifically applied in situations where the erotic
messages of nude dancing are perceived to create negative moral and
societal effects." Thus, the law is not content-neutral, and to treat it
as such is a fiction that harms content-neutral analysis.
Finally, the plurality in Barnes stated that nude dancing is
expressive conduct within the realm of First Amendment protection,
but specified that it is "only marginally so."" Just what this means is
difficult to say. What is clear, is that the plurality further eroded the
Constitution's protections as they apply to sexually explicit expression
by emphasizing that they may be outweighed by "substantial
The
government interest in protecting order and morality.""
decision elicits the fundamental question: Who determines which
forms of expression are permissible under the public morality test?
In other words, the problem with this reasoning is that it relies on an
inherently majoritarian standard. This is contrary to the countermajoritarian First Amendment immunity and its provision for the
equality of minority speakers."9
Furthermore, if Justice Rehnquist's logic is extended, Barnes
could enable the Court to revisit other cases. For example, if the
Court balanced the value of flag burning against the state interest in
order and morality, the Court could overturn Texas v. Johnson... on
the grounds that such conduct is highly offensive to society's moral
185. Id at 577 (Scalia, J., concurring); See id. at 596 (White, J., dissenting).
186. See Glen Theatre, Inc., v. Civil City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Ind.
1985). "Timothy J. Corbett, a sergeant with the South Bend Police Department and
stationed in the South Sector of South Bend where all arrests at Chippewa Bookstore have
occurred, stated in his affidavit that no arrests have ever been made for nudity as part of a
play or ballet." Md at 730.
187. Barnes,501 U.S. at 592-94 (White, J., dissenting).
188. Id at 566.
189. Id. at 569.
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
191. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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views. Ironically, just prior to Barnes, the Court founded its holding
in Johnson on the notion that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable." ' 9 Thus, the O'Brien test was
not satisfactorily applied in Barnes because the regulation of morality
should not serve as a substantial governmental interest." 3
B. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. 94 concerned an ordinance virtually
identical to the Indiana city ordinance upheld by the Court nine years
ago in Barnes.95 In fact, because the Court had upheld the Barnes
ordinance, the City of Erie specifically modeled its ordinance
prohibiting public nudity"9 after it."9 Compliance with the ordinance
by erotic dancers requires them to wear, at a minimum, "pasties" and
a "G-string. ' 98
Despite the fact that the Erie ordinance was virtually identical to
that found in the Barnes case, the Court's holding was again
fragmented, yet the Justices' opinions were substantially different.
The. plurality garnered four votes this time and was authored by
Justice O'Connor. Once again, the O'Brien analysis was adopted by
the entire Court. The plurality's analysis, however, adopted Justice
Souter's secondary effects analysis in Barnes."9 As such, the plurality
concluded that Erie had the power to regulate such an important
governmental interest, that these secondary effects were not related
to free expression and that the regulation was no greater than

192. Id. at 414.
193. Apparently unsatisfied with the outcome of Barnes, the Court chose to revisit the
issue. City of Erie v. Pap'sA.M. involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania indecency statute
virtually identical to the Indiana statute in Barnes. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
recognizing that eight of nine Justices opined nude dancing protected by the First
Amendment, held that the Barnes plurality was not binding and followed the dissent's
reasoning in holding that the statute was unconstitutional. 719 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998), cert.
granted,119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
194. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
195. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
196. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 284 (citing ERIE, PA., CODE 75-1994, art. 711 (1994)).
197. See Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 290.
198. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 284.
199. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 291. The stated rationale for doing so was the
"Pennsylvania [Supreme] court's determination that one purpose of the ordinance is to
combat harmful secondary effects ....
Id. at 292.
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necessary to further the regulatory interest.2
Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, was virtually
identical to the one he offered in Barnes. Justice Souter, however,
had a significant change of heart. "I may not be less ignorant of nude
dancing than I was nine years ago, but after many subsequent
occasions to think further about the needs of the First Amendment, I
have come to believe that a government must toe the mark more
carefully than I first insisted."'"
Justice Souter now insists that where the asserted rationale for
upholding a regulation is that it combats negative secondary effects,
that rationale "demands some factual justification ..... 2m "In Turner
I, for example, we stated that
when the Government defends a regulation on speech
as a means to address past harms or prevent
anticipated harms, it must do more than simply 'posit
the existence of the disease sought to be cured.' It
must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.'
"[I]n Turner II, a majority of the Court reiterated those requirements,
characterizing the enquiry into the acceptability of the Government's
regulations as one that turned on whether they 'were designed to
address a real harm, and whether those provisions will alleviate it in a
material way."'" "The upshot of these cases is that intermediate
scrutiny requires a regulating government to make some
demonstration of an evidentiary basis for the harm it claims to flow
from the expressive activity, and for the alleviation expected from the
restriction imposed." 5
Thus, Justice Souter's version of a secondary effects analysis
would require substantial evidence. Further, his definition of
"substantial" would require that the evidence be "good", not merely
"a lot."
200. See id. at 292-96.
201. Id. at 317.
202. Id. at 311.
203. Id. at 312 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994) (Turner I)).
204. Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)
(Turner II)).
205. Id. at 313.
206. It is encouraging to note that the lower courts may be adopting Justice Souter's
point of view. In a recent Ninth Circuit case involving a city ordinance banning the
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[H]owever accurate the recital may be and however
honestly the councilors may have held those
conclusions to be true over the years, the recitation
does not get beyond conclusions on a subject usually
fraught with some emotionalism.
The plurality
recognizes this, of course, but seeks to ratchet up the
value of mere conclusions by analogizing them to the
legislative facts within an administrative agency's
special knowledge, on which action is adequately
premised in the absence of evidentiary challenge....
[I]t is one thing to accord administrative leeway as to
predicative judgments in applying elusive concepts to
circumstances where the record is inconclusive and
'evidence ... is difficult to compile,' and quite another
to dispense with evidence of current fact as a predicate
for banning a sub-category of expression.
Justice Souter's position was further fueled by the fact that a
"scientifically sound" study showing that nude dancing establishments
do not cause secondary effects had been offered by an amicus
curiae.' The plurality, however, flatly rejected this point. "'[T]he
invocation academic studies said to indicate' that the threatened
harms are not real is insufficient to cast doubt on the experience of
the local government. '" Incredibly, the plurality continued: "[I]t is
evident that, since crime and other public health and safety problems
are caused by the presence of nude dancing establishments... a ban
on such nude dancing would further Erie's interest in preventing such
'
secondary effects."210
There is another interesting difference between the Barnes and
Pap's A.M. ordinances; the Erie ordinance also prohibited "the
exposure of any device, costume, or covering which gives the
operation of adult bookstores and relying on the secondary effects rationale, the court
refused to allow the city to rely ONLY on an extraneous study which did not specifically
address the possible secondary impacts in the actual city's situation. See Alameda Books,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719 (2000).
207. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 314.
208. Id. at 300.
209. Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)).
210. Id. at 300-01 (emphasis added). The position here articulates the traditional
secondary effects analysis begun in Young and expanded in Renton allowing for "proof" to
be based on the "experience" of other municipalities. Cf. "Because the nude dancing at
Kandyland is of the same character as the adult entertainment at issue in Renton [and]
American Mini Theatres, it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that such nude dancing
was likely to produce the same secondary effects." Id. at 296-97.
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appearance of or simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft...

or... simulates and gives the realistic appearance of nipples and/or
aureole."2"' The constitutionality of this language was not raised, but
it was made the object of some discussion among the opinions
regarding the true intent of the ordinance and the applicability of
secondary effects.212 Justice Steven's dissent argued that the presence
of the language revealed that the true intent of the ordinance was to

213
regulate offensive speech, not its secondary effects.
Given the Pap's A.M. holding, one may argue that the Court is
moving in a direction away from supporting regulation of sexually
explicit speech based on morality and towards demanding empirical

evidence of the damage it assertedly causes.2"

The Pap's A.M. plurality opinion's failure to demand such
evidence, however, seems to be merely another form of regulation of
speech based on notions of its moral unworthiness. The Pap's A.M.
secondary effects rationale for regulating sexually explicit speech is
in order and morality" adopted
little distance from the "social interest
21 5
in ParisAdult TheatreI v. Slaton.

V. Conclusion
A lower standard of protection under the First Amendment for
erotic material is clearly expressed in each of the cases this note has

examined.216 Such treatment, however, runs contrary to traditional
211. Id. at 284 (citing ERIE, PA., CODE 75-1994, art 711, §2 (emphasis added)).
212. See generally Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
213. See id. at 317-32.
214. The Court has recently reaffirmed that regulations of sexually explicit speech are
subject to strict scrutiny and that the secondary effects doctrine does not apply to the
analysis of regulations targeting the "primary" effects of such speech. See United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. 529 U.S. 803, 814-15 (2000). The confusion the
doctrine has engendered, however, continues to proliferate. In striking down a public
nudity regulation the Ninth Circuit stated that a regulation aimed at secondary effects is
subject to content-neutral analysis but (siding with J. Souter) rejected the government's
reliance on "bad" evidence requiring that the study be "reasonably believed to be relevant
to the problem that the city addresses." Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222
F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52). Is this truly an
"intermediate scrutiny" or merely a "rational relation" test? On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit, faced with a similar ban on nudity, relied on the secondary effects
doctrine in holding that the ordinance was content based but should be analyzed "as if" it
were a content-neutral time, place or manner restriction. The court then struck down the
ordinance because it was not "narrowly tailored." Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d
831, 840-48 (7th Cir. 2000).
215. 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957)).
216. See supra Parts II-IV.
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First Amendment analysis and rationale. Traditionally, the main
inquiry in free speech cases was whether a legislative body was able to
conclusively establish a connection between a certain kind of speech
activity and a regulable conduct evil."' Justice Brennan is correct in
requiring that the Court cast a skeptical eye on categorical legislative
judgments that conclusively establish the coincidence of sexually
explicit speech with some regulable evil. He would require
"governments to regulate based on actual congestion, visual clutter,
or violence rather than based on predictions
that speech with a
218
certain content will induce those effects.,
What Justice Brennan implies is that the Court should uphold a
restriction on speech only if the legislature can show the actual
occurrence of the regulable evil, not just some possibility or
probability that it might happen simultaneously with the speech, or as
an inevitable result of it. "The traditional approach sets forth a
bright-line rule: any restriction on speech, the application of which
turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based
restriction
219
regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.
The analytic weakening of the Free Speech doctrine in
diminished prior restraint requirements, illustrated by FW/PBSV°; the
deterioration of the traditional content/non-content distinction in
cases like Young' and Renton; and the increased acceptance and
application of the negative secondary effects doctrine as shown by
Barnes and Pap's A.M., ' 4 as applied to sexually explicit speech
cases, creates a grave danger of courts upholding laws that purport to
regulate non-speech evils, but are actually designed to restrict the
217. The connection between the kind of speech activity and regulable conduct evil is
important because: "[T]he choice of the correct method of analysis [in free spcech cases]
is, to a large extent, a function of federalism and separation of powers concepts.
Specifically, one must scrutinize the deference a court will show to a federal, state, or
municipal legislative body when it attempts to regulate activity that includes or is a result
of speech. The closer a legislature is able to connect regulable conduct with speech, the
more likely a reviewing court will defer to the legislative judgment concerning the
regulation of the speech which is a part of, or attendant to, the conduct." Prygoski, Justice
Sanford and Modern Free Speech Analysis: Back to the Future?, 75 KY. LJ. 45, 46-47
(1986-87).
218. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,326 (1988).
219. Id at 335-36.
220. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
221. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
222. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
223. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
224. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
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underlying speech activity.
This is why the analysis of the Court's treatment of sexually
explicit speech is crucial. More than merely a "slippery slope," the
Court's treatment of sexually explicit speech defines the boundaries
and structure of First Amendment protections. The basic rationale
for the First Amendment is to foster the dialogue crucial to the
healthy functioning of a democratic society.' It does so by assuring
everyone the ability to express themselves despite how contrary those
expressions may be to the populist view. "Offensive" speech is by its
nature "unpopular." Underlying the Court's conclusion that sexually
explicit speech is of lower value is the public's disdain for it. As
Justice Stewart reminds us, however, "[t]he guarantees of the Bill of
Rights were designed to protect against precisely such majoritarian
limitations on individual liberty."' 6

225. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,271-72 (1964).
226. Young, 427 U.S. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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